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RACE, CLASS AND INCOME INEQUALITY:
A MARXIAN ANALYSIS

Discussion Paper #24

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Much recent Marxian literature on race and class has largely focussed on a limited number of issues. These include the boundaries of race and class (and their possible overlap), whether it is race or class that is 'most significant' in explaining black poverty and racial income inequality, whether racism is or is not in the material interests of white workers, and the ways in which racism may be functional to the reproduction of capitalism. In addition, much of this literature is economistic. Race is seen as an ideology, one produced by the economic base (slavery or capitalism) to legitimate its particular form of exploitation.

Without developing a full critique of this literature, several of its most important limitations can be pointed out. First, it is deterministic; it largely presumes the functionality of race for capitalism. It thereby omits entirely or greatly understates the contradictions that race may entail for the reproduction of capitalism. Second, and more precisely, the basic concepts of race, racism, and class are most often incompletely or only implicitly theorised in Marxian terms in this literature. "Race' is either accepted relatively unproblematically as a concept denoting existing groups of people or rejected as being the ideological (and hence 'false') construct of the economic base. Rarely are concepts of race explicitly theorised at a general level as to their content (meaning), reproduction and effects. Thus,
this literature little develops a basic conceptual analysis of race that could be employed to analyse such diverse 'racially stratified' social formations as Malaysia and South Africa. Similarly, the concepts of 'class', to which 'race' is 'related', also have multiple, often implicit meanings in the literature, in terms of, inter alia, power, property, exchange, and the extraction of surplus labor.

Finally, the literature does not analyze racial income inequality in class terms, partly as a result of its incomplete consideration of both race and class. Thus, racial income data is presented unproblematically and then discussed in simple terms of its functionality or dysfunctionality for capitalism. Once again, this precludes examination of many possible political and economic contradictions.

In responding to this literature, and at least some of its noted limitations, this paper has three general tasks: 1) to reconceptualise the concept 'race'; 2) to then theorize the relation of 'race' and 'class'; and 3) to employ this analysis in the theorization of class and non-class aspects of racial income inequality. These are limited tasks; they are intended to pose these questions of race and class at a general theoretical level. Thus, the paper does not attempt to produce a conjunctural analysis of a concrete social formation but to initiate a theoretical discussion anterior to such analysis.
The Analysis of Race

Race is here understood as a socially constructed concept that names and distinguishes groups of people as separate races. Seen as such, it constitutes at least a two-sided object of analysis for Marxian theory. First it is a socially constructed concept of human difference; race is the contradictory effect of the entire ensemble of (class and non-class) processes constitutive of the social formation. To analyse this race-as-discourse, Marxian theory examines 1) the content or meaning of race concepts, 2) their contradictory and uneven reproduction, and 3) their overdetermined effects on the other aspects of the social formation (and hence on the lived experiences of people in society), including class.

On the other hand, race as an object of analysis is also the social group of people delineated by (as one effect of) the race concept. Here Marxian theory analyses such a designated race group with respect to 1) the discursive and non-discursive conditions of existence of that groups being so named as a race, 2) the occupation by group members of both class and non-class positions and the degree to which (if any) race is a condition of existence of such occupation, and 3) the effects of group 'membership' on class and non-class processes and those who occupy positions in them. Thus, Marxian analysis of race qua social group raises as open-ended questions both the 'class structure' of 'race' (if any) and the effects of race on the reproduction of class.
Race Discourse

Race concepts are here defined as those concepts of human group differentiation that have at least the first and possibly all of the following three characteristics. First, all race concepts specify certain 'biological', empirically observable physical features (e.g., skin color) as identifying the 'races'. Second, many race concepts then ascribe to the physically identified 'races' certain specific, stereotyped psychological, social, cultural, behavioral traits. Race concepts are thus here understood as socially constructed concepts of ascription. They pick out (identify) a set of features and ascribe them with the label 'race'. This process of ascription involves the delineation of the specific set of observable features and very often their association with a particular set of behavioral characteristics.

Further, the particular process of race ascription may have at least one more aspect: it may give a particular characterization to the association of the designated features with the ascribed traits. One common such characterization is to label both the physical features and their associated traits and characteristics as being 'natural'. (Another is to deem this association a product of culture with no basis in nature.) The behavioral traits specified are 'inherent', part of the 'nature' of those people having the designated physical features. Thus, as discussed here, some race concepts of ascription may be
concepts of biological (or cultural) determinism.

All race concepts (whether they involve all three aspects or only the first) are here understood as being socially constructed within the social formation of which they are one aspect. The ascription of race as a natural concept (i.e., one corresponding directly to an aspect of human nature) is a contradictory product of, for example, biological, natural history and anthropological discourses. From a variety of different disciplines, much recent literature has analysed concepts of the human races (sic) and concluded that, according to the precepts of biological discourse, there is but one human race and the ascriptive link between racially differentiated groups and their associated traits within humanity are broken. As the geneticist Richard Lewontin puts it:

Racism draws credibility from what seems to be obvious differences in some physical traits like color, hair form, or facial features. ...we are conditioned to observe precisely those features and ... our ability to distinguish individuals as opposed to types is an artifact of our upbringing. ...Clearly, those superficial differences in hair form, skin color, and facial features that are used to distinguish 'races' from each other are not typical of human genes in general. Human 'racial' differentiation is, indeed, only skin deep. Any use of racial categories must take its justification from some other source than biology. (p. 13)

But concepts of the human races as defined here have never been concepts of biological discourse.

Rather, race is a term taken from the discourses of biology and natural history and inscribed with new meaning (defined as a new concept) within a separate discourse: race
discourse. The formation of such a discourse has been
effected by a wide variety of identifiable social factors.
West has discussed how the structure of rational, Cartesian
discourse laid the foundation for the structure of race
discourse. Mosse has shown in his study of European racism
that both classical aesthetics and theology, respectively,
delineated physical features and associated behavioral
characteristics of race in Western Europe and produced
concepts of Jews as a race. Hua has examined political and
class factors as they effected the British use of Islam in
the construction of the race concept "Malay national
identity". Frederickson shows how class, political and
demographic factors (as well as religion) overdetermined the
behavioral meanings ascribed to the observable race
designations in both the colonial United States and in 17th
and 18th century South Africa. As a final example, Kovel has
analysed how the unconscious process itself, complexly
effected by class and non-class processes, mediated the
formation of race concepts, particularly in terms of the
association of the 'black race' with the Freudian and
Hegelian "Other".

Indeed, the ascription of "otherness" to a particular
race, i.e., the perjorative association of characteristics
socially defined as being negative to a particular 'race',
renders race concepts 'racist'. That is, racist race con-
cepts designate one race 'superior' and the 'Other' race
'inferior'. This inscription of "Otherness" in race concepts
may require, as some of its conditions of existence, inter alia, particular political processes (including certain power relations) and class processes (e.g., the slave and/or capitalist class processes) as well as the cultural or discursive factors already discussed.

These aspects of the social formation that constitute the conditions of existence of race concepts do not determine them; rather they overdetermine the race concepts. This
means that the social construction of race concepts is a contradictory and uneven process of ascription. It is a process which results in changing (and multiple, coexisting) definitions and meanings of race, meanings which do not change in lock-step accompaniment to any other aspect or group of aspects of the social formation (including the class aspect).

Class

Within this Marxian theoretical framework, class is defined with respect to surplus labor (the amount of social labor performed over and above that needed to reproduce the social existence of performers of surplus labor). The fundamental class process is the economic process of the performance/appropriation of surplus labor. Two class positions are defined with respect to the fundamental class process – that of the performer of surplus labor and that of the appropriator or extractor of surplus labor.

Further, this theory defines a second class concept – that of the subsumed class process. This is the economic process of the initial distribution of the appropriated surplus labor. Two class positions are also defined with respect to the subsumed class process – that of the distributor of surplus labor and that of the receiver of the distributed surplus labor. All other economic processes and all political, cultural and natural processes are conceptualised here as non-class processes as
they involve neither the performance/appropriation nor the
distribution/receipt of surplus labor.

As understood within this approach, individuals or
groups of people may occupy more than one (fundamental or
subsumed) class position (or none at all). Neither a person
nor a group has a class essence. This is the case not only
since a person or group may occupy multiple class positions,
but in another sense as well. The occupation of even a
single class position requires, as a condition of its
existence, that the person (or group) also occupy one or more
non-class positions (i.e., participate directly in non-class
processes).

Thus, for example, the occupation of the class position
of productive laborers (performer of capitalist surplus
labor) has, as a condition of its existence that the
individual also participate in the non-class economic process
of the exchange of his/her labor-power for a sum of value.
This, in turn, may have as a condition of existence that the
same individual participate in particular ways in political
processes (e.g., such that they are legally 'free' to sell
their labor-power). In another case, a condition of
existence of occupation of the fundamental class position of
capitalist (appropriator of surplus value) may be the
participation in economic processes resulting in the personal
acquisition of wealth and ownership of property in the means
of production. Likewise, involvement in certain non-class
processes of power may also be such a condition of
existence, as will be discussed below.

Finally, this is also the case for the occupation of class positions by any designated social group (e.g., race or gender). The extent to which any such group is characterised by the occupation of a specific (possibly uniform, possibly unique) set of class positions (i.e., its 'class structure') is an overdetermined result of class and non-class; political, economic and cultural processes in the social formation. This brings us to the specific question of race and class.


Race and Class

As already discussed, this Marxian theory conceptualises race as a notional social group. As such it is defined and delineated by the concepts and operation of race discourse. Membership in a particular 'race' is an effect of the cultural process of ascription. It results from ascribing to the individual the physical features appropriate to the particular race concept and then (possibly) the ascription of the associated psycho-socio-behavioral traits. To be a 'member' of a particular 'race' group is thus to be doubly ascribed as such by race discourse.

Having examined the operation of race discourse in socially constructing the delineation of different race groups, Marxian theory then turns to the 'other side' of race. It theorises the race group in class terms; it examines the occupation by members of a 'race' of fundamental and subsumed class positions. It thus theorises the specific 'class structure' of that 'race' (if any) and the degree to which that class structure differs from those of other socially delineated race groups.

In particular here, Marxian theory analyses the degree to which the ascription of race (or the definition of 'race identity') is a condition of existence of the occupation of one or more fundamental and/or subsumed class positions. In this vein, the overdetermined cultural process of race ascription is understood as effecting a variety of political, economic (class and non-class), and cultural processes
resulting in a differential (though not necessarily uniform) pattern of lived experience by 'race'. This (and not the purported epistemological correspondence of race concepts to biology and behavior) is the materiality or reality of race as understood by Marxian theory. One aspect of this differentiated materiality of race may be a racially differentiated occupation of fundamental and/or subsumed class positions.

As discussed above, the occupation of any particular fundamental or subsumed class position (or set of class positions) has conjuncturally defined conditions of existence. These may include, inter alia, power, property, wealth, education, religion or legal status. They may also include race; membership in a particular race may be a condition of existence of the occupation of a particular class position. More specifically, within a particular social formation, race discourse may overdetermine legal or theological status, custom, access to power, property or wealth, and thereby partly determine who may or may not occupy certain class positions on the basis of race membership. This is an overdetermined effect of the dual ascription of race: the physical features allowing for identification of race membership and the associated ("Other") traits which render such differentiated legal status or access to property (for example) and hence occupation of certain class positions, "natural" or at least "reasonable".

For example, ascription of membership in the "Jewish
race" may have been associated with a different theological and legal status for Jews in Europe. This differentiated 'status' may have overdetermined reduced access to power, property and certain kinds of economic transactions (e.g., the hiring of wage-labor, particularly of other races). This, in turn, may have resulted in Jews being able to occupy subsumed class positions of merchant and moneylender but not that of fundamental appropriator of surplus labor.

This analysis of the overdetermination of class by race can, and needs be, extended to examine the conditions of existence of both an individual race member's occupation of multiple and subsumed class positions and of a specific race group's occupation of a specific set (or sets) of class positions. However, in such analysis, the conditions of existence and the actual pattern of occupation of class positions must not be conflated. Specific political, economic, and cultural processes resulting in what is commonly termed oppression may be conditions of existence of the racial monopoly by blacks of the slave class position (or their exclusion as a group from the capitalist class position). This does not, however, mean that all blacks will necessarily be slave performers of surplus labor (or wage-laborers). Social processes (including that of race ascription) may render all backs legally and politically "unfree" - slaves in the legal/political sense. Yet some of these legal/political black slaves were house slaves and some were field slaves. House slaves may have occupied subsumed class positions while field slaves were performers of slave
surplus labor. Moreover, while all blacks in the antebellum US South were ascribed 'inferior' not all were 'unfree' (i.e., not all were legal/political slaves). These non-slaves were excluded from the occupation of fewer class positions.

The point here is that the uniformity of race with respect to one aspect of the social formation (e.g., legal status) does not determine but rather overdetermines the racial occupation of class positions (i.e., the degree of homogeneity of class membership within a given 'race'). Expressed in other language, the 'permeability' of race as a 'gatekeeper' distinction vis-a-vis the occupation of class positions is overdetermined. It is effected by specific physical features, religion, education, the labor market, law, etc., and it can change over time. There is no inherent, uniform or unchanging relation of 'race' and 'class' as understood within this Marxian theory.
Within this Marxian theoretical framework, questions of racial income inequality and economic discrimination are posed as follows – in class analytic terms. Racial income inequality is theorised in three steps. The first step is to specify the class and non-class components of income. The second is to analyse how and the degree to which race membership determines the occupation of particular class and non-class positions and hence receipt of the associated incomes. The final step is to analyse how and the degree to which ascribed race identity might effect (raise or lower) the income of individuals occupying particular class or non-class positions. The discussion of the class aspects of income is confined to consideration of the capitalist class processes and excludes any consideration of non-capitalist fundamental and subsumed class processes.

Income may be comprised by class and non-class components. (This analysis is based directly on the class analysis of income distribution by Resnick and Wolff). Fundamental class incomes are the direct flows of either necessary or surplus labor to those occupying the relevant fundamental class positions. In the case of the capitalist fundamental class process, these two class incomes are the value of labor-power (v) paid to productive laborers and surplus value (s) appropriated from productive laborers by capitalists. Subsumed class incomes are, by contrast, the
initially distributed flows of surplus labor; capitalist subsumed class income is the initially distributed flow of surplus value (ssc) to subsumed class members. Examples of such subsumed class incomes may include salaries to unproductive managerial personnel, dividends to holders of common stock in capitalist industrial enterprises, and taxes paid directly by such enterprises to the state. Finally non-class incomes (nc) are understood as redistributed flows of value throughout the economy, i.e., income received as a result of the occupation of neither a fundamental nor a subsumed class position. Examples might include wages received for labor-power sold to other than capitalists or taxes paid by productive laborers to the state.

Thus, according to Marxian theory, the class and non-class components of income (y) (excluding all non-capitalist class components) may be expressed as follows:

\[ y_i = y_i + s_i + \xi_{ssc_i} + \xi_{nc_i} \]

where individuals (i) may possibly occupy one or another or both of two fundamental class positions and/or multiple subsumed class and non-class positions. This is the first step of the analysis of racial income inequality - the class specification of the constitutive components of income. The analysis continues by examining each class and non-class component first in terms of racial differentiation of occupation of that particular class or non-class position and then in terms of the racial differentiation of the level of income received.
The first class income flow to be considered is the value of labor-power, the magnitude of capitalist necessary labor paid to productive laborers so that they may purchase wage-commodities and thereby reproduce their labor-power commodity. The value of labor-power, as conceptualized by Marx, has two aspects—a use-value and an exchange-value aspect as follows:

\[ v = \sum \left( \frac{c}{c^L} \right) uv_i \]

where \( uv_i \) = the quantity of the \( i \)th wage-commodity purchased to reproduce labor-power and \( ev/uv_i \) = the exchange-value per unit use-value of the \( i \)th wage-commodity. The bundle of \( uv \) wage-commodities (\( v^C \)) is the "real wage-income" of productive laborers, the real commodity bundle consumed to reproduce their labor-power. The value of labor-power may be differentiated amongst productive laborers either via differentiation of \( v^C \), the real wage-income, or by that of the \( ev/uv_i \) paid for these commodities (the latter not being considered here for reasons of length).

Race ascription may differentiate incomes by its effects on the value of labor-power in one of two ways. First, it may debar members of certain races from the occupation of the class position of productive laborer. This might be the case, for example, when the ascription of "Otherness" to members of a particular race (e.g., blacks) results in its legal unfreedom, while legal freedom is a condition of existence of the ability to sell one's labor-power, itself a condition of existence of occupying the class position of productive laborer. If members of a specific race group are so
debarred, the v element of income is not received by them.

Second, even if race does not debar individuals from receipt of the value of labor-power component of income, it may result in the differentiation of vₜ among productive laborers on the basis of race. It may do so by differentiating the real standard of living (v̅) purchased with the value of labor-power. This racial differentiation of v̅ and hence of vₜ may occur in any one of, at least, four interrelated ways. First, as discussed by Marx, the value of labor-power may differ according to different levels of skill, if the reproduction of these skills requires increased consumption of wage-commodities. If race ascription results, for example, in the association of lower mental ability to members of the race deemed "Other" (e.g., general assumptions by whites about West Indians in England) or to its members receiving inferior education, this skill differentiation of the wage may also entail its racial differentiation.

Second, processes of race ascription might also associate certain kinds of work with certain races as a result of the attribution of behavioral or psychological characteristics to them (e.g., the term "cooler work" associated with Indians) Laws, customs, and expectations may, to greater or lesser degree, inscribe such associations in differentiated labor markets. Thus, race may separate certain non-class processes on a racial basis, e.g., that of the exchange of 'black' labor-power for a wage from that of
the exchange of 'white' labor-power for a wage. Assume for the present that the wage is equivalent to the value of labor-power (this assumption is altered below) and that there is a large reserve army in the 'black' labor market and a small one in the 'white' labor market. This may result in white productive laborers having a greater ability than black productive laborers to struggle for higher wages and may thus result in the racial differentiation of both the wage and the value of labor-power.

Third, and expanding the previous point, the racially differentiated non-class process of the exchange of labor-power for the value of labor-power (and hence the determination of the latter) may be further reinforced if race ascription differentially affects the ability of productive laborers to organise collectively and struggle over wages. This might be the case, for example, as in South Africa where, prior to 1978, only whites were deemed 'civilized' and hence termed 'employees' under the labor
law: blacks were deemed 'uncivilized' and hence termed 'labor units' under the law. Only 'employees' could form registered trade unions, engage in binding collective bargaining with employers and (until 1973) legally strike in South Africa. Blacks could thus only form unregistered and relatively powerless unions which limited their ability to struggle over wages and, inter alia, this lowered their wages (and value of labor-power) below those of whites. Here, occupation of non-class positions (e.g., trade union membership) on a racially differentiated basis overdetermined a racially differentiated class income (v) going to individuals occupying the same class position (that of productive laborer).

Finally, race ascription might also differentiate v racially by producing concepts of racial standards of living. For example, (white) transnational capitalist employers might ascribe to productive laborers who are members of other (e.g., Chinese or Korean) race groups an inherent acceptance or preference for a 'simpler' (i.e., lower) standard of living. This may lead them to pay a wage sufficient to purchase only a smaller real bundle of wage-commodities. Indeed, processes of race ascription may transform the poverty of certain races into a normative concept of their preferred standard of living in the minds of employers (e.g., the 'uncivilized' standard of living of Africans in South Africa). This may be reinforced by the racial division of the labor market such that there is a large reserve army of members of the excluded race. In such a case, the payment of
a wage sufficient only for the racially lower standard of living might result in neither lower productivity or a shortage of productive labor-power (the 'underpaid' being replaced by the unemployed) thus reinforcing the notion of the sufficiency, even desirability of the lower wage for these productive laborers.

These are but four possible ways in which race may complexly differentiate the value of labor-power on the basis of race, partly via the racial differentiation of participation in non-class positions as discussed. A fuller analysis would specify more precisely how race concepts produced such effects. It would also examine the contradictory and uneven effects of race in this vein (including the permeability of race as a barrier to the occupation of non-class positions such as union membership) and their conditions of existence.

The second fundamental class income is surplus value. This is the amount of value produced by productive laborers within capitalist production over and above the value of labor-power. Other things being equal, the greater is the value of labor-power, the less is the magnitude of surplus value (s) and its rate (s/v), and vice versa.

Race ascription may effect the receipt of this income in one of three ways. First, it may limit the occupation of the fundamental class position of capitalist. This may be the case, for example, if occupation of this class position has as one of its conditions of existence the occupation of one or more non-class positions (such as purchaser of labor-
power) and occupation of these latter positions is racially exclusive. Thus, for example, processes of race ascription might effect customs, laws or the acquisition of wealth such that it is impossible for Indians to hire white labor-power in South Africa or Chinese to hire Malay labor-power in Malaysia. In such a case, the racial exclusion (e.g., of Indians or Chinese) from occupation of a non-class position (purchaser of the labor-power commodity) may result in the racial exclusivity of the capitalist fundamental class position and hence the receipt of the surplus value component of income.

Second, race may affect the receipt of surplus value income via its effects on the value of labor-power. On the one hand, if, as noted by many Marxists, race 'divides the working class' in terms of the occupation of certain non-class positions (e.g., trade union membership or sale of labor-power in particular labor markets), it may reduce the ability of all productive laborers to struggle over the wage. It may thus possibly lower the value of labor-power received by all productive laborers below what it otherwise would have been and, ceteris paribus, raise the magnitude of surplus value received by all capitalists. On the other hand, race may also differentially lower, as discussed above, for example, the value of black labor-power below that of white labor-power. Other things being equal, it may thus differentially, unevenly increase the amount of surplus value received by capitalists employing mostly black productive laborers. Here
the racial differentiation of the value of labor-power overdetermines the surplus value component of income.

Finally, under certain conditions, capitalists of one race (e.g., black capitalists) may receive less surplus value than those of another race (whites), even under conditions of a racially uniform value of labor-power. Here race may effect the ability of capitalists to extract surplus value from productive laborers. This might be the case when productive laborers of one race increase their resistance to the extraction of their surplus labor by capitalists of another race. (Of course, the opposite result is also a pri"r possible: that such resistance is greater for capitalists of the same race.) Alternatively, such racial differentiation of surplus value might also be the effect of racial exclusivity of the occupation of non-class positions. The extraction of surplus value and its expansion might require participation in one or more non-class processes, such as the borrowing of money or purchase of constant and variable capital (i.e., the accumulation of capital). If race ascription were to make say Chinese-owned banks less ready to loan money to Malay capitalists, this could reduce their ability to accumulate capital and hence increase their extraction of surplus value. Race might in these, and other, ways limit the surplus value component of income according to the ascribed race identity of the particular person occupying the class position of capitalist.

The third class component of income is the subsumed class receipt of distributed surplus value (ssc). This class
income may be associated with an exchange of equivalents as when surplus value is distributed in the form of wages paid to unproductive managerial personnel in exchange for their labor-power commodity. Contrariwise, it may also not involve the exchange of equivalents as when surplus value is distributed to common stock holders in the form of dividends.

In the former case, surplus value may be distributed in the form of wages to unproductive laborers hired directly by capitalists (in which case capitalists also occupy the subsumed class position of distributors of surplus value) in exchange for the labor-power of the former. Here the link between the wage and the value of labor-power is broken. The wage \( w \) may have two distinct class components - the value of labor-power and the wage distribution of surplus value to unproductive laborers, so that

\[
(3) \quad w_j = v_j + \sum ssc_j
\]

where \( \sum ssc_j \) are all the wage transfers of surplus value to subsumed classes.

Race may overdetermine the receipt of such \( ssc_j \) wage transfers of surplus value in one of two ways. On the one hand, it may conjuncturally be a gatekeeper vis-à-vis the occupation of these subsumed class positions (or at least some of them). For example, a condition of existence of occupying the subsumed class position of unproductive manager may be certain behavior patterns not ascribed to certain races or educational credentials rarely acquired by members of certain races (prep at Choate, then Harvard and the
Sorbonne). The racial exclusion, thus, of certain non-class processes of education might result in that of subsumed class positions and hence receipt of \( y \) incomes. On the other hand, to the degree that race differentiates markets for unproductive laborers and their trade unions (or professional associations), it may have effects similar to those discussed above in terms of \( y \) in differentiating and lowering the \( ssc \) component of the wage on a racial basis. The difference is that here, with respect to the \( ssc \) and not the \( y \) component of wage income, such effects do not have direct implications for the extraction of surplus value.

In the latter case (i.e., surplus value is received in association with no exchange of equivalents), race may effect the receipt of the subsumed class income in at least two ways. First, as before, race may be a direct gatekeeper, debarring members of of the race deemed "Other" from this class position. This may have been the case when Jews were excluded from membership on the stock exchange.

Second, race may also have rather more indirect effects on occupation of this class position. As before, it may effect the degree to which members of particular races can secure the conditions of existence for the occupation of particular subsumed class positions and struggle over the magnitude of surplus value distributed to them. On the one hand, a condition of existence of such occupation may be the acquisition of wealth - as money to lend or with which to purchase land for rental to capitalists, common stock etc. The degree to which income is overdetermined so as to be
unequally lower for member of the "Other" race, the less they will be able to acquire wealth and hence occupy this class position and receive the non-wage subsumed class income, thereby perhaps perpetuating and exacerbating racial income inequality. On the other hand, there may have been other racial restrictions associated with the occupation of such class positions. These may have included segregatory restrictions that confined members of the excluded race to, for example, loan money or rent land to smaller capitalists, perhaps capitalist of their own race. This may have restricted their ability to struggle successfully for a large non-wage transfer of surplus value as the greater number of such excluded subsumed class members may have been competing for a relatively small, racially restricted say, financial market. The size of the non-wage income flow might be a fortiori smaller still if, say, Indian financiers and landlords in East Africa could only loan money or rent land to Indian capitalists, themselves extracting a smaller s income.

Finally, race ascription may also overdetermine the receipt of non-class income. This is a flow of value received as the result of the occupation of neither a fundamental nor a subsumed class position. It may be a wage income, as when labor-power is sold to a non-capitalist (e.g., when a productive or unproductive laborer hires a
servant to clean house), or a non-wage income, as when landlords receive rent from non-capitalists (e.g., productive laborers) or when interest is paid on a mortgage by a subsumed class member. In the former case, the wage is now expanded to include the non-class component:

\[ w_i = v_i + \varepsilon \text{ss}c_j + \varepsilon \text{nc}_j \]

In the case of non-class wage income, the questions concerning race as a gatekeeper or segmenter of labor markets and limiter of class struggles over the wage are raised once again in the context of the non-class component of wage income. It may be the case, for example, that race ascription results in primarily, say, blacks being relegated to the non-class exchange of labor-power for wages as servants and the fundamental receipt of a lower value of labor-power in that segment of the productive labor market to which they were relatively excluded. This may be the class analytic meaning of the so-called secondary labor market as it applies to races deemed "Other", e.g., blacks in the United States.

In the case of non-wage, non-class income, race may differentiate access to and the magnitude of this income in ways broadly similar to its effects on the receipt of non-wage subsumed class incomes. For example, the state may distribute income to a variety of people. Unless the state is partly constituted by the capitalist fundamental class process, and it is here assumed that it is not, such income transfers are non-class incomes. Race may overdetermine the particular flows and their magnitudes. For example, in the
military blacks may be overrepresented (vis-a-vis their proportion of the total population) in the (lower) enlisted ranks and whites overrepresented in the (higher-ranking) officer corps, thus resulting in a racially differentiated state transfer of wage income to military personnel, given the positive correlation between rank and income.

Another possible way in which race might effect state non-class income transfers concerns the lowest-paid, racially differentiated wage-earners, be they productive laborers, subsumed class members or non-class sellers of labor-power. A condition of existence of their receipt of such low wages (vis-a-vis other (white) wage-earners) as specified above, is their ascribed membership in the "Other" race(s) with all its associations. This has resulted in them receiving lower wages than members of other races. Other things being equal, such low wages, with their accompanying low levels of real consumption (\(\nu^c\)), might threaten the reproduction of their labor-power and hence their productivity. This might, however, be at least partially offset by their relatively greater access to certain state non-wage, non-class income transfers, such as welfare, aid to families with dependent children, etc. Such transfers might, for example, be made with reference to a designated poverty level of income below which members of certain races might fall more frequently than others (see also the discussion above about racial standards of living as normative concepts). These non-wage, non-class transfers from the state (or from private
charities, churches, etc.) may then provide some of the
conditions of existence of the racial lowering of class and
other non-class components of income without (or with less)
negative effects re: labor productivity and, in the case of
racially lowered v. the magnitude of surplus value.

Thus, racial income inequality is not seen here as a
simple or mechanical effect of race, class, dual labor
markets, or divisions in the working class, though it may be
related to all of these. As discussed, processes of race
ascription might effect racial differentiation of each of the
class and non-class elements of income either by a) debarring
members of certain races from (or mandating their occupation
of) specific class and non-class positions and hence receipt
of the associated incomes, or b) differentiating and limiting
the particular class and non-class income received by
those ascribed with membership in the "Other" race.
Conclusion

This paper began by specifying race as a two-fold object of analysis: as a socially constructed concept and as a social group named and distinguished by that concept. In examining this race object of analysis, this paper has had three inter-related tasks: 1) to define the race concept and race discourse, and some of their conditions of existence, 2) to theorise the relation (if any) between race and class, and 3) to employ these analyses to examine racial income inequality. Throughout the attempt has been to address these issues at their most general theoretical level and not in terms of particular race concepts or social formations. To my knowledge this general theoretical project has not previously been attempted within Marxian theory.

Race concepts were theorised as the overdetermined products of cultural processes of ascription which 1) identify certain biological features (e.g., skin color) as signifying race, 2) possibly associate to people seen as having these features certain psychological-cultural-social-behavioral traits and characteristics, and 3) possibly deem such features and their associated traits as inherent, as part of the 'nature' of that 'race'. Further, pejorative race concepts were designated by the label racist, partly by virtue of their ascription of "Otherness" to members of a particular race, i.e., to their designation of inferior and superior races. Such race concepts were specified as overdetermined social constructs, that is, contradictory,
uneven and ever-changing concepts of group differentiation.

Next, having discussed this Marxian theory’s concept of class, the discussion then turned to the relation of race and class, i.e., to the analysis of the 'class structure' of those social groups designated as races. In other words, the analysis considered how a particular race group might occupy a specific and different set of class and non-class positions than members of another such race group. This begins the class analysis of race qua designated social group. This analysis concluded that there is no necessary or inherent relation beteen race and class whatsoever. Race discourse has no necessary effects on the occupation of any class position or set of class positions. However, in a particular social formation, at a particular conjuncture, it is certainly possible, even likely, that processes of race ascription and the propagation of race discourses may so overdetermine political, cultural and economic (class and non-class) processes as to make it more or less likely (in extreme cases to bar or guarantee) that members of certain races occupy certain class positions. As a result of this analysis, I conclude that, as race may have these overdetermined effects on class, in order to understand one must also understand race (as well as non-class processes as indicated).

Further, the analysis of racial income inequality has shown that race may likewise provide the basis for the differentiation of income, both by limiting the occupation of
class and non-class positions and by differentiating the incomes received for such occupation by race, thought this too is not a necessary result. Here the analysis goes beyond the previous literature that discusses "race" incomes and that which discusses "class" incomes to show how race and class overdetermine the differentiation of income.
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